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Abstract. The present article gives an overview of different approaches on semiot-
ics as science, its objects of investigation, methods and genesis (where, how and 
when does semiotics begin?). The author does not aim at establishing one prescrip-
tive approach. Quite the opposite, by leaving the question open, the author aspires 
to encourage further discussion about the criteria for scientificity, establishing the 
borders of scientific disciplines, and the productivity of the dialogic (or, rather, 
polylogic) scientific meta-discourse in science in general and in semiotics in par-
ticular.
Understanding prescissively considered is specu-
lative or practical, but cognitive life fully as 
human perforces embraces both […]. And just 
this truth is what semiotics brings to the fore 
within the sciences, both coenoscopic (such as 
philosophy and theology) and  ideoscopic (science 
in the modern sense).
 (Deely 2005: 205 fn)
A look back over the history of semiotics reveals that it moves in parallel, 
and frequently overlaps with the development of philosophy, linguis-
tics and logic.1 Semiotics developed into a distinct discipline during the 
1 As is well known, there are several answers to the question of the origin of scien-
ce, depending on the chosen definition of science. It can be argued that semiotics as 
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1950s and 1960s; thus it is a very young science. Juri Lotman has noted 
that semiotics as a science “originates from the fifties of our century at 
the cross-roads of several scientific fields: structural linguistics, infor-
mation theory, cybernetics and logic (due to this “hybrid” origin the 
representatives of these various sciences understand the subject-matter 
and nature of semiotics in somewhat different ways)” (Lotman, J. 2000: 
8). In fact, this hybridity is even more pronounced when one considers 
that a large part of semiotics is closely associated with philosophy (espe-
cially phenomenology and hermeneutics; it has even been considered 
as identical with the latter), and that it has been influenced (especially 
in its structuralist vein) by what Julia Kristeva has called the thought of 
the 20th century — Freudism and Marxism (Kristeva 1969: 34). Clearly, 
these circumstances surrounding the birth of semiotics do not make the 
best recommendation for gaining the honorific title of “science”.
a conscious use of signs began with the appearance of human thought: “Scientific 
thought is impossible as both an activity and as a problem prior to the appearance 
of a philosophical space in our culture. Science is by definition a universal kind 
of knowing and activity. Its appearance must be preceded by the appearance of a 
new kind of consciousness; science arises as a universal dimension of mankind” 
(Mamardashvili 1996: 78). Compare Deely: “this same discipline in nuce — semi-
otic as the doctrine of signs — is discernible in the most ancient origins of Greek 
medicine, philosophy, and linguistic reflections” (Deely 2005: 8). Modern science is 
considered to have started during the 17th century. Here, too, semiotics has a say: 
John Locke provided a definition of semiotics in his An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690). Contrary to this, Tzvetan Todorov argues that “a summary 
notion of semiotics, two components of which are important here: the fact that, 
with semiotics, we are dealing with a discourse whose objective is knowledge (not 
poetic beauty or pure speculation), and the fact that its object is constituted by signs 
of various types (not by words alone). These two conditions were fully met for the 
first time […] by Augustine. But Augustine did not invent semiotics; […] he merely 
combined ideas and notions drawn from several horizons” (Todorov 1984: 15).
273Semiotics as science
The nature of semiotics, its object
Any scientific discipline presumes an object of study, which is usually 
present in the name of the science itself, and a particular methodology. 
Umberto Eco thinks that compared to other sciences, semiotics finds 
itself in a more complicated situation in this respect:
Semiotics is in an even more difficult situation because of a double embarrass-
ment: (i) modern semioticians are still questioning the main categories of the 
field and (ii) there has been no common agreement in the course of so-called 
semiotic investigations about a reduced list of basic categories. (Eco 1997: 733) 
Indeed, as follows from its name, for semiotics, the object of study is 
the sign (in contemporary semiotics, this also covers sign relationships, 
sign processes, etc.). In fact, this leads to initial difficulties and prob-
lems, since in semiotics there are at least two definitions of sign, with 
two strands proceeding from them: the semiotics of Peirce/ Morris and 
the semiology of Saussure. This divergence is further supported by the 
fact that the Saussurean vein was primarily represented in the works 
of European (especially French), and the Peircean stream in the works 
American researchers. This nominal distinction persisted for quite a 
while and American semiotics “won” partly only as a result of the efforts 
of Sebeok; the difference in content nevertheless persists.2
While both are sciences of the sign, they are positioned differently. 
Peirce represents a philosophical approach, his sign is triadic, and an 
important role is played by semiosis, or sign action (sign process). For 
him, logic3 (that is, semiotics with a different name)4 is a science of 
2 In his Basics of Semiotics, John Deely notes how Sebeok was upset by the fact 
that “Greimas, a glottocentrician if there ever was one, claimed for his portentously-
named ‘Paris School’ the designation ‘semiotics’ rather than the far more apt title of 
a school of ‘semiology’” (Deely 2005: 189 fn).
3 “logic, in its general sense, is […] only another name for semiotic, the quasi-
necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs” (CP 2. 227). 
4 In this, Peirce adheres to the tradition of John Locke, who in his An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding divides human knowledge into three spheres: 
physics (which, according to Thomas Sebeok, should be thought of as analogous 
to today’s natural sciences), that observes things and pursues speculative truth; 
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general regularities, amounting to a purposeful thinking that proceeds 
from ethical principles, depends on phenomenology and mathemat-
ics and consists of three parts: criticism — classification of arguments 
and determination of their validity and intensity; speculative gram-
mar — general theory of signs; and methodeutic — the methods used. 
Without delving too deep into Peirce’s contributions, let us note that 
in his classification of sciences, he positions semiotics into class A (sci-
ence of discovery), under the subdivision of philosophy (cenoscopy, 
philosophia prima) that consists of Phenomenology, Normative science 
(aesthetics, ethics and semiotics) and Metaphysics (CP 1.176–1.283).5 
Deely argues that it can be concluded from this classification that 
“Peirce himself did not finally realize how radical semiotics is as a form 
of knowledge vis-à-vis the established disciplines” (Deely 2005: 148 fn). 
Indeed, near the end of his life, Peirce seems to have gotten lost in his 
labyrinth of “infinite semiosis”, and today there are few who would 
have the will and energy to follow him there. For this reason, there 
has developed a rather simplistic understanding of Peirce’s semiotics 
(which, nevertheless, is sometimes conducive to the inception of a spe-
cific paradigm).
The story of the legacy of the second founder of semiotics, Ferdinand 
de Saussure, is a peculiar one, not often encountered in the history of 
the sciences. It is well known that his main work (Course in General Lin-
guistics, published posthumously in 1916), from which semiology drew 
practice (the most important part being ethics, that is, the human sciences), whose 
purpose is to struggle towards just and fulfilling actions; and semiotics, which would 
be the connecting link between the first two. “Semeiotika, or THE DOCTRINE OF 
SIGNS; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Logika, 
LOGIC: the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes 
use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others” (John 
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, Book IV, Chapter XXI; 
Locke 1979). It should be noted that for Locke, logic was precisely the study of logos, 
that is, a concept much wider than what is today known as logic. For this reason, it 
seemed natural for him to identify logic with semiotics.
5 For more information, see Pietarinen 2006.
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its foundations, was compiled from course notes taken by his students.6 
For Saussure, the new, incipient science called “semiology” was a part 
of social psychology, studying the life of signs at the heart of social life, 
with linguistics forming but one part of semiology. Thus the science of 
signs was originally to have a rather humble role (especially compared to 
that of Peirce). But if we were to continue enquiring, on the background 
of what was just said, after the status of semiotics as a science, it is clear 
that it was precisely the semiologic vein that attained greater success 
and recognition, finding its greatest expression in structuralism (with 
which semiotics is often identified, or considered part of, even today). 
And in structuralism, linguistics was placed at the centre: 
[W]e must now face the possibility of inverting Saussure’s declaration: lin-
guistics is not a part of the general science of signs, even a privileged part, it is 
semiology which is a part of linguistics: to be precise, it is that part covering 
the great signifying unities of discourse. By this inversion we may expect to 
bring to light the unity of the research at present being done in anthropo logy, 
sociology, psychoanalysis and stylistics round the concept of signification. 
(Barthes 1967: 11)7 
The popularity and attraction of structuralism was elicited by the belief 
that at long last a method had been discovered that would raise the 
lowly human sciences almost to the level of the exact sciences. Guided 
by the idea that the structure of language is identical to the structure of 
thought and the principles of the organization of the world,  the concept 
of structure as used in linguistics was extended to different spheres of 
life and human activity. Yet by this very orientation towards becoming 
an exact science, with signs perceived as particular constructs, struc-
turalism inclined towards the denial of consciousness and the subject 
(which, predictably enough, brought about a counter-reaction in the 
form of post-structuralism).
6 It allegedly also contains things that Saussure never said (see, for example, Bouis-
sac 2010).
7 Linguistics became the paragon of structuralist studies due to its level of formal-
ization, for which reason it seemed natural to turn to linguistics in the search for a 
methodology. Yet in linguistics, semantics (a term coined only in late 19th century) 
was an underdog from the very start; great strides were made mainly in phonology.
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The semiologic route was summarised by Algirdas Greimas, who, 
in his dictionary of semiotics of 1979, co-written with Joseph Courtès 
(Greimas, Courtès 1982), provides three meanings for “semiotics”: 
1) any manifested entity under study; 2) an object of knowledge as it 
appears during and after its description (this covers the typology of 
various semiotics, derived by Greimas from Louis Hjelmslev); 3) the set 
of ways that make this object possible. What we have here is already a 
semiotic theory (Greimas, Courtès 1982: 287). In addition, they provide 
a definition of scientific semiotics (also born of Hjelmslev’s ideas): “by 
scientific semiotic systems — in the broad sense of “scientific” — we 
understand an object-semiotics treated within the framework of scien-
tific theory, explicit or implicit” (ibid., 288). According to Greimas, no 
satisfactory semiotic theory yet exists, but he does have a clear concep-
tion of it (that is, at the core of every semiotic theory there must be a 
theory of meaning8), and this conception received its practical expres-
sion in his book Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method (Greimas 
1984). Discussing the difference between European and American semi-
otics, Greimas makes note of the problem of the referent, which tends 
to widen this breach: 
Whereas the analysis of signs is for European semiotics but one step toward 
a description of the articulation network of forms, American semiotics (T. 
Sebeok) tends to stop at the level of signs and to proceed to a classification of 
these signs, based for a large part on the type of relation existing between the 
sign and the referent. (Greimas, Courtès 1982: 297)
Among Estonian semioticians, Mihhail Lotman9 has published his 
views on this topic; he, too, divides semiotics into two, yet in an attempt 
to let go of the Peircean/Saussurean dichotomy, wishing instead to dis-
8 “The human world as it appears to us is defined essentially as the world of sig-
nification. The world can only be called “human” to the extent that it means some-
thing. Thus it is in research dealing with signification that the human sciences can 
find their common denominator. Indeed, if the natural sciences ask questions in 
order to understand how man and the world are, the human sciences pose the ques-
tion, more or less explicitly, of what both of them signify.” (Greimas 1984: 1)
9 The views of others have, unfortunately, been presented only in oral discussions 
and thus cannot be quoted.
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tance himself from the prevalent position (inherent, in his view, to Eco 
and French researchers10) according to which semiotics (not unlike 
philosophy) is characterised not by a specific domain of research, but 
rather by methods, and is thus capable of successfully studying both 
semiotic and non-semiotic phenomena: the semiotic nature of a thing 
is not given a priori, but is the result of a semiotic analysis. To this, Lot-
man opposes his own view: “Semiotics is an empirical discipline that 
is engaged in the study of the structure, semantics and conditions of 
functioning of different sign formations” (Lotman, M. 2001: 419 fn). 
This empiricism can, in principle, proceed from both the Saussurean 
and the Peircean treatment of signs (at least in my opinion). Constantly 
emphasizing the differences between, and the incommensurable nature 
of the tradition of Peirce (substitutive semiotics, proceeding from the 
scholastic thesis “aliquid stat pro aliquo”, attempts to include as many 
phenomena in semiotics as possible) and Saussure (closed and intense 
bilateral semiotics, the sign itself becoming represented in a substance 
fundamentally different from it) (Lotman, M. 2001: 422–429), he never-
theless makes use of both in his empirical (?) study of fear. He follows 
up on this topic in a subsequent paper (Lotman, M. 2002), in which he 
calls Peirce’s semiotics atomistic (with the process of identification as 
the basis of semiotics), and Saussure’s semiotics holistic (with transla-
tion as the basis of semiotics), finally claiming that 
In the contemporary semiotics we can see a certain disproportion between the 
semiotical theory and practical results. Using the offered terms, the semiotical 
theory proceeds above all from the atomistic paradigm, but the most impor-
tant and interesting results from the holistic one. Consequently, the practical 
task, in my opinion, is to develop the holistic semiotical theory. (Lotman, M. 
2002: 525)
10 To lump together Eco and French researchers in this manner is rather mislead-
ing (and certainly Eco himself would disagree with it). There are many French se-
mioticians active in the field, and they come in all stripes and colours. With a certain 
allowance one could discuss the similarities between Eco and French post-structur-
alists, but even here I would be cautious in drawing conclusions.
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The present author would rather align Peirce with the holistic side (by 
keeping in mind his concept of “infinite semiosis” and synechism). Even 
M. Lotman’s claim that in Peircean semiotics the topics studied are 
nearly all subsumed under the domain of speech, seems rather to sup-
port the holistic conception. Acknowledging the role of language (not 
as presented in the Saussurean dichotomy, but in the everyday sense) 
in the development of humans as a biological species, Peirce’s followers 
(Sebeok, Deely) in fact develop an integrative view of the world perme-
ated by a unifying force — semiosis.11
In conclusion, the two strands of semiotics can be clearly different-
iated, even if their interpretations may differ. There is also no basis to the 
claim that one of them (Peirce’s) leads to philosophical generalisations 
and the other deals with concrete studies of signs.
Semiotics and other sciences
Let us now turn to the “epistemological trihedron” proposed by Michel 
Foucault in his The Order of Things (2002[1966]), to search for an answer 
to the question whether semiotics fits into this scheme, and if yes, then 
where could it be placed. As is well known, in this book Foucault argues 
that the human sciences were born only in the late 19th century (made 
possible by the emergence of the object of these sciences — man). Fou-
cault never identified himself either as a structuralist, poststructuralist, 
semiotician or a philosopher (although he has been called all of these). 
His influence on a wide range of topics is very evident to this day. Gilles 
11 Deely claims that semiosis as a subject of semiotic investigations “would estab-
lish nothing less than a new framework and foundation for the whole of human 
knowledge. This new framework and foundation would embrace not only the so-
called human and social sciences, as we have already seen from the partial tradition 
of semiology after Saussure, but also the so-called “hard” or natural sciences, pre-
cisely as they, too, arise from within and depend in their development upon experi-
ence and the processes of anthroposemiosis generally, as the wholistic tradition of 
semiotics after Peirce has begun to outline” (Deely 2005: 36).
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Deleuze12, who had a long friendship with Foucault, has said that his 
work links up “with the great works that for us have changed what it 
means to think” (Deleuze 2006: 120).
Now according to Foucault, the modern episteme is characterised 
by a three-dimensional space:
In one of these we would situate the mathematical and physical sciences, for 
which order is always a deductive and linear linking together of evident or 
verified propositions; in a second dimension there would be the sciences (such 
as those of language, life, and the production and distribution of wealth) that 
proceed by relating discontinuous but analogous elements in such a way that 
they are then able to establish causal relations and structural constants between 
them. These first two dimensions together define a common plane: that which 
can appear, according to the direction in which one traverses it, as a field of 
application of mathematics to these empirical sciences, or as the domain of the 
mathematicizable in linguistics, biology, and economics. The third dimension 
would be that of philosophical reflection, which develops as a thought of the 
Same; it forms a common plane with the dimension of linguistics, biology, 
and economics: it is here that we may meet, and indeed have met, the various 
philosophies of life, of alienated man, of symbolical forms (when concepts and 
problems that first arose in different empirical domains are transposed into the 
philosophical dimension); but we have also encountered here, if we question 
the foundation of these empiricities from a radically philosophical point of 
view, those regional ontologies which attempt to define what life, labour, and 
language are in their own being; lastly, the philosophical dimension and that 
of the mathematical disciplines combine to define another common plane: that 
of the formalization of thought. (Foucault 2002: 378)
The human sciences13 reside in none of these dimensions or planes, 
however, but do reside within the space of this trihedron, dispersed 
in its interstices. For this reason it is so difficult to define their pre-
cise location, and also the reason why they appear so threatening for 
12 In What is Philosophy?, co-written with Felix Guattari, Deleuze, too, provides 
a kind of a spatial model of thinking and its basic forms, a topology of thought in 
which all of human thinking is divided into three fields: “Philosophy, art, and sci-
ence are not the mental objects of an objectified brain but the three aspects under 
which the brain becomes subject, Thought-brain. They are the three planes, the 
rafts on which the brain plunges into and confronts the chaos” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1994: 210).
13 According to Foucault, history marks the beginning of all human sciences.
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the other sciences (the slightest deviation from the rigorously defined 
planes of the trihedron leads to the danger of being contaminated 
with the human sciences — “psychologism”, “sociologism”, in a word, 
“anthropologism”. This is the source of their essential instability: 
What explains the difficulty of the ‘human sciences’, their precariousness, 
their uncertainty as sciences, their dangerous familiarity with philosophy, 
their ill-defined reliance upon other domains of knowledge, their perpetually 
secondary and derived character, and also their claim to universality, is not, 
as is often stated, the extreme density of their object; it is not the metaphysical 
status or the inerasable transcendence of this man they speak of, but rather the 
complexity of the epistemological configuration in which they find themselves 
placed, their constant relation to the three dimensions that give them their 
space. (Foucault 2002: 380)
Now if we were to try to determine the location of semiotics, in which 
dimension or plane would it find itself? Would it be nowhere and 
every where, just like the human sciences? At this point, the diversity 
of semiotics becomes especially noticeable: structuralism would fit on 
the formal plane of thought (the structural semantics of Greimas, early 
studies by Kristeva, the models of Zholkovsky and Shcheglov from the 
Tartu–Moscow school, and others); the different directions of the speed-
ily developing biosemiotics14 would fit both between the 1st and the 2nd 
dimension (for example, Vehkavaara 2002) as well as the 2nd and 3rd 
dimension (for example, bioethics, etc.; see Weber 2002; Ponzio, Petrilli 
2001), with its major part most likely remaining close to the 2nd (for 
example, Pattee 2005). Deely’s approach to semiotics, however, can be 
wholly placed in the 3rd dimension.
In this sense semiotics is a human science par excellence, with its 
special capability to mix up, to infiltrate15, to posture as a universal sci-
ence. It is for this reason that semiotics is sensed as threatening, yet as 
it often happens with dangerous things, it is also seen as exciting and 
attractive.
14 I thank Kalevi Kull for this helpful information.
15 The intrusion of semiotics into all fields of the sciences is well illustrated by the 
four-volume encyclopaedia of semiotics (Posner et al. 1997–2004), in which one 
can find “Semiotic aspects of X”-type entries about almost all branches of science.
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A good example of how science bureaucracy is still in trouble with 
placing semiotics, is the Common European Research Classification 
Scheme (CERCS) that is at this moment in official use in Estonia, and 
where semiotics is located in subsection H352 Grammar, semantics, 
semiotics, syntax (H means Humanities). We can only sigh and be 
happy that the division was not worse. 
Semiotics as modelling and criticism
A view of semiotics related to the above, but still somewhat different 
from it, has been proposed by Julia Kristeva, writing during the golden 
era of semiotics, when she and her colleagues were actively participat-
ing in the group that had gathered around the journal Tel Quel16; people 
who sincerely believed in the omnipotence of their Semiotic project.
Niels Bohr had already declared that a scientist has no truck with 
“reality”; their work has to do with building models.17 The specific 
nature and distinguishing feature of semiotics that sets it apart from 
the exact sciences is, according to Kristeva, that although “just like in 
the exact sciences, the models created in semiotics are, in essence, rep-
resentations, and as such have tempo-spatial coordinates”, nevertheless 
“semiotics in fact differs from the exact sciences precisely because it 
produces the theory of this modelling that it itself is — theory that can, 
in principle, be applied to objects that are not representational by their 
nature” (Kristeva 1969: 29–30).
16 In 1960, Philippe Sollers, together with young avant-garde writers founded the 
journal Tel Quel, which became the mouthpiece of the French (post)structuralism 
ever since the second half of 1960s. The goals of TQ were: 1) to create a general 
theory of sign systems; 2) to formalise semiotic systems from the perspective of 
communication, that is, to attempt to distinguish the zones of meaning-generation 
in communication; 3) to politicize text (here: discourse). In principle, all politics 
proves to be a product of language politics (Tel Quel 1998). 
17 “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is 
wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns 
what we can say about nature […].” (McEvoy 2001: 291) 
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Kristeva paints a very confident picture of the future of semiotics 
and its future missions: 
Originating at the point where the most diverse sciences enter into a contact 
with a continuous theoretical process, semiotics is incapable of being petri-
fied as one particular science, nor, moreover, science as such: semiotics — it 
is an open road of research, it is criticism always turned towards itself, that is, 
self-criticism. Being a theory of itself, semiotics is that sort of thinking that is 
capable, without turning into a system, of modelling itself. (Kristeva 1969: 30) 
Proceeding from this, Kristeva ends up redefining the very concept of 
the scientific: 
Being the space where the sciences are abolished, semiotics emerges as the 
self-consciousness of this process, and thus as a revaluation of “scientificity”; as 
something lesser (or greater) than science, semiotics is a space for obliterating 
aggression and illusion within scientific discourse. (Kristeva 1969: 31)
Semiotics thus turns into the ideology of the sciences, it strives to 
become a discourse that would be capable of “shifting the metaphysi-
cal speech of the philosopher18 with the rigour of its scientific language 
— language capable of creating different models of social functioning 
(different semiotic practices)” (Kristeva 1969: 55).
A semiotics of this sort would make use of the models of other sci-
ences, applying them to the sign practices being studied; and with it 
will demolish those 
precise premises that lay at the foundation of the scientific approach; as a result, 
linguistics, mathematics and logic, being merged with semiotics, appear as 
“demolished premises” that have nothing (or very little) to do with the status 
that they have outside the boundaries of semiotics. These supplementary sci-
ences not only form a kind of warehouse from which semiotics would derive its 
models, but are, for semiotics, an object of denial: semiotics denies this object 
in order to form explicitly as critical practice. (Kristeva 1969: 32) 
Such liberties taken with the assets of other sciences inevitably generate 
protest and feelings of being threatened, already discussed with relation 
to Foucault, above.
18 Inevitably, a parallel arises here with Husserl’s claims for re-creating philosophy 
as an exact science.
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Semiotics as foundational or meta-science
Semiotics has been accused of “imperialism”, in that it attempts to 
achieve a special status among the other sciences, to rise above them. 
How do semioticians themselves substantiate this unique role for semi-
otics? And how substantial are these substantiations? 
In 1984, a paper was published by leading semioticians, a manifesto 
of a sort, in which a definition was provided of the nature of semiot-
ics and its place among other sciences. It was this that gave rise to the 
definition of semiotics as an “umbrella science”: 
a semiotics which provides the human sciences with a context for reconcep-
tualizing foundations and for moving along a path which, demonstrably […], 
avoids crashing into the philosophical roadblock thrown up by forced choices 
between realism and idealism, as though this exclusive dichotomy were also 
exhaustive of the possibilities for interpreting experience. (Anderson et al. 
1984: 7)19
The authors of this thesis represent Peircean semiotics and proceed 
from the concept of semiosis. But principally the same conclusion 
can be reached by following the path laid down by Louis Hjelmslev in 
his Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, who elaborated Saussurean 
themes: 
We find no non-semiotics that are not components of semiotics, and in the 
final instance, no object that is not illuminated from the key position of lin-
guistic theory. Semiotic structure is revealed as a stand from which all scientific 
objects may be viewed. (Hjelmslev 1961: 127)
Among contemporary semioticians, the most ardent defender of the 
idea of semiotics as the connecting link between the human and the 
19 Compare with: “Semiotics is beyond doubt a science without an object; the very 
fact of semiosis appears as secondary, as a play of the mind, as a search for way of 
describing. So, semiotics is, a priori, a metascience — due to the absence of an object 
and the way we use semiotics models” (Chernov 1988: 7).
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natural sciences (that is, permeating both nature and culture)20 is John 
Deely: 
Semiotic is a perspective or a point of view that arises from an explicit recogni-
tion of what every method of thought or every research method presupposes. 
Semiotic arises from the attempt to make thematic this ground that is common 
to all methods and sustains them transparently throughout to the extent that 
they are genuine means by which inquiry is advanced. (Deely 2005: 13) 
Thus “semiotics provides a perspective on the whole of experience in 
what is proper to it as experience. In achieving this, it becomes “first” 
among the sciences […]” (Deely 2005: 102).
As we can see, all this still lies in the future of semiotics, whereas 
today 
Among the human sciences, semiotics is unique in being a study concerned 
with the matrix of all the sciences, and in revealing the centrality of history 
to the enterprise of understanding in its totality. The centrality of history to 
understanding is revealed through the codes of culture that alone sustain, 
beyond the individual insight, the commens […] or shared mentality […]. 
(Deely 2005: 109)
The above arguments are closely related to the conception of semiotics 
as an inter-(trans?)-disciplinary science. One can also perceive here the 
pretension of solving basic philosophical issues. But the problem of the 
relation between semiotics and philosophy is too broad to fit into the 
scope of this paper.
From here it would be logical to proceed to a survey of semiotics as 
theory of science and a basis for studies of science. Walter A. Koch’s col-
lection Semiotik und Wissenschaftstheorie, published in 1990, dissects 
semiotics as science with a characteristically German thoroughness. In 
the book, Christoph Hubig (1990) divides semiotics into two: object-
science and meta-science. The first covers semiology as derived from 
Saussure’s linguistic studies and conceived as a general science of the 
sign, in which the object of study is the (primarily linguistic) sign and 
20 For Thomas Sebeok, who is Deely’s greatest influence, “semiotics is really the 
study of the relationship between the mind and reality” (Sebeok 1997: 291) and he, 
too, fails to see a rigid distinction between the humanities and the “hard” sciences.
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the relations between the signifier and the signified, and which is char-
acterized by reconstruction. Peirce’s semiotics, on the other hand, is 
characterised by reflexion, and this connects semiotics with the herme-
neutic tradition. At the same time, however, Hubig argues that it would 
be rather important to distinguish different levels of reflexion within 
semiotics, and that this would allow the observation and analysis of the 
most diverse scientific phenomena (Hubig 1990).
In his unification of theory of science, science itself and reality, Wal-
ter Koch proposes a conception of “evolutionary cultural semiotics” that 
would, according to him, form the foundation of this kind of holistic 
model of the world, and would provide much-needed perspective (Koch 
1990).
In conclusion
This paper does not strive to be comprehensive or to declare final truths. 
Several fascinating and important problems were left aside (for example, 
semiotics and philosophy, semiotics and cognitive sciences, semiotics in 
practice, pseudosemiotics).
If we were to try and wrap this paper up while keeping its title in 
mind, we could perhaps take a look at semiotics in light of Imre Lakatos’s 
research programs (Lakatos 1980), and note that, without doubt, there 
exist research programs proceeding from Saussure and Peirce (and, in 
Estonia, perhaps from Juri Lotman, too)21, all of which have a more or 
less hard core and a certain zone of defence. If we were to ask whether we 
are dealing with scientific, that is, progressing programs, or pseudosci-
entific ones, then in light of Lakatos’ theory I could not provide a clear 
answer. Is semiotics a research program in which theory would lead us 
to the “discovery of hitherto unknown novel facts” and provide us with 
“dramatic, unexpected, stunning predictions”22, or is theory left behind 
21 Biosemioticians would probably also add Jakob von Uexküll.
22 One could perhaps refer to Deely’s conception, in which, after a discussion of 
the four ages of semiotics (of understanding), the coming of a fifth age, not earlier 
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by facts? Can we even discuss the temporal succession/anteriority 
of theory and facts with respect to that part of semiotics that strives 
for the role of science(?) that would unite all other sciences, precede 
them and cover them all? If semiotics amounts to constant modelling 
and criticism, to a theory of itself, as Kristeva has argued, then this 
opposition of theory and fact seems to slip through our fingers. In fact, 
this is yet another thing of which semiotics is accused: that it doesn’t 
“give a handle to itself”. It doesn’t even want to be “normal science” 
in the Kuhnian sense. The appearance of such a paradigm is further 
hindered by the fact that semiotics re-creates its method, and partially 
its meta-language, anew every time, on the basis of its research object. 
But semiotics does seem to correspond to the second criterion, that of 
the consistency of the research program (especially if we bear in mind 
Lakatos’s own examples: Marxism and Freudism). It is difficult to resist 
the temptation to quote Deely again, for whom the contemporary, post-
modern era has brought to light two very fruitful suggestions: “The first 
is a new definition of sign which brings out the fundamental character 
of semiotics for any theory of experience and knowledge: a sign is what 
every object presupposes. The second is a useful description, or perhaps 
we could even say an adequate definition, of semiotics itself as the study 
of the possibility of being mistaken“ (Deely 2005: 175).23 Is this sufficient 
for semiotics to bear the name of science? Not according to Lakatos. Yet 
than the 22nd, and most likely not before the 25th century, is predicted. This is when 
a new generation of intelligible semiotic animals has developed, for whom the con-
cept of “sign action”, objective relation to sign systems generated by the interaction 
of nature and culture, speculative and practical, is entirely natural (Deely 2001: 157).
23 Deely opposes his definition to two different ones (which can be considered as 
the result of a coherent research program): “First, the celebrated proposal of Umber-
to Eco (1976) that semiotics is the study of whatever can be used to lie falls short by 
being one-sided […] Second, the less widely known but equally theatrical definition 
proposed by Paul Bouissac according to which semiotics is the study of whatever 
is interesting has the defect of being too broad, but the merit of implying the point 
that whatever is interesting involves semiosis, which is that from the study of which 
semiotics properly speaking results; but, owing to the intrinsic indifference of the 
sign to the reality of its object in any determinate or univocal sense, what semiotics 
reveals is the possibility of error as always alongside and even intrinsic to the means 
by which we investigate truth” (Deely 2005: 175 fn).
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is not Lakatos’ theory itself but one more research program, amenable 
to refutation? And besides, it seems that semiotics does not really worry 
about its own scientificity. It just is.24
Translated from Estonian by Silver Rattasepp
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Семиотика как наука
В статье дается обзор различных воззрений (от корреспондирую-
щих до взаимоисключающих) на научный статус семиотики, объект 
и предмет ее исследований, метод и «точку отсчета» (с чего начина-
ется семиотика, когда и как?). Автор не ставит своей целью вынесение 
вердикта, напротив: вопрос остается открытым, что провоцирует 
дальнейшие размышления о критериях научности, о границах научных 
дисциплин, о продуктивности диалогического (или, скорее, полило-
гического) научного метадискурса в науке вообще и в семиотике — в 
частности.
Semiootika teadusena
Artiklis antakse ülevaade erinevatest vaatepunktidest semiootikale teadu-
sena, tema uurimisobjektist, meetodist ja kujunemisloost (millest algab 
semiootika, kuna ja kuidas?). Autori eesmärgiks ei ole mingi lõpliku tõe 
väljakuulutamine, vaid vastupidi — küsimus jääb lahtiseks, ärgitades 
edaspidiseid mõtisklusi teaduslikkuse kriteeriumite, teadusdistsipliinide 
piiritlemise, dialoogilise (õigemini polüloogilise) teadusliku metadiskursuse 
produktiivsuse üle teaduses üldse ja semiootikas sealhulgas.   
